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Abstract	
Latin	 America	 has	 neither	 suffered	 the	majority	 of	mass	 atrocities	 in	 the	 contemporary	
world	nor	the	worst	of	them	but,	after	a	sustained	period	of	transition	to	democracy,	it	holds	
the	record	for	the	most	domestic	trials	for	human	rights	abuses.	Argentina	is	an	emblematic	
case	in	Latin	America	and	the	world.	Due	to	the	early	development	of	its	human	rights	trials,	
their	 social	 impact	and	 their	 scale,	 it	 has	 a	 leading	 role	 in	what	 is	 known	as	 ‘the	 justice	
cascade’.	 Until	 recently,	 leading	 scholars	 in	 sociology	 of	 punishment	 have	 studied	 the	
penality	of	‘ordinary	crimes’	through	causally	deep	and	global	narratives	largely	from	the	
perspective	of	the	Global	North.	State	crimes	and	regional	paths	of	transitional	justice	have	
been	 neglected	 in	 their	 accounts.	 This	 paper	 will	 question	 this	 state	 of	 affairs	 –	 or	
‘parallelism’	–	through	an	exploration	of	the	punishment	of	both	‘common	crimes’	and	‘state	
crimes’	 in	 Argentina,	 thus	 contributing	 to	 the	 growing	 body	 of	 scholarship	 on	 southern	
criminology.	
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Introduction	
Although	the	grand	narratives	of	the	sociology	of	punishment	(Late	Modernism,	Postmodernism,	
Post‐Fordism	 or	 Neoliberalism)	 continue	 to	 offer	 a	 valuable	 theoretical	 framework	 for	 social	
sciences,	 they	 have	 some	 limitations.	 These	 narratives	 privilege	 knowledge	 produced	 in	 the	
Global	North	over	other	regions	of	the	world	and	sometimes	apply	categories	of	the	Global	North	
universally.	 For	 this	 reason,	 they	 have	 recently	 been	 problematized	 in	 general	 social	 theory	
(Connell	 2007)	 and	 postcolonial	 theory	 (Cunneen	 2011),	 as	 well	 as	 in	 feminist	 criminology	
(Carrington	2014)	and	southern	criminology	(see	Carrington,	Hogg	and	Sozzo	2016).	
	
At	present,	relatively	few	works	from	within	criminology	or	the	sociology	of	punishment	–	still	
mostly	carried	out	in	Europe	–	are	studying	transitional	justice	issues	which	tend	to	be	relegated	
to	‘new	trends’	in	edited	collections	that	draw	on	perspectives	and	readings	in	these	disciplines	
(see	the	activities	of	the	European	Criminology	Group	on	Atrocity	Crimes	and	Transitional	Justice	
(ECACTJ)	 of	 the	 European	 Society	 of	 Criminology;2	 also	 Karstedt	 2010;	 Parmentier	 2011;	
Savelsberg	2010).	This	novelty	in	mainstream	criminology	is	mainly	related	to	the	impact	caused	
in	the	Global	North	by	the	judging	of	crimes	in	Rwanda	and	the	former	Yugoslavia	and	the	creation	
of	the	International	Criminal	Court	(1998)	(Cohen	1995,	1996,	2001;	Cunneen	2011;	Morrison	
2006;	 Parmentier	 2011;	 Savelsberg	 2010;	 Stanley	 2010).	 The	 relevance	 of	 these	 events	 was	
heightened	recently	when,	in	2009,	the	Stockholm	Prize	in	Criminology	was	surprisingly	awarded	
jointly	to	American	John	Hagan	for	his	empirical	research	on	the	genocide	in	Darfur	and	to	the	
Argentinian	Raul	Zaffaroni	for	theoretical	work	on	mass	crimes	(Parmentier	2011:	423).	
	
Even	so,	studies	on	the	punishment	of	common	crimes	and	crimes	of	the	state	are	rarely,	if	ever,	
combined	 in	 a	 comprehensive	 approach.	 Instead,	 they	 are	 treated	 as	 separate	 and	 unrelated,	
assuming	different	–	almost	parallel	–	lines	of	inquiry,	even	in	places	such	as	Latin	America	where	
common	crime	and	the	experience	of	dictatorships	and	bloody	repression	make	it	difficult	not	to	
cross	these	lines	of	inquiry.	
	
In	this	paper	I	aim	to	contribute	to	the	growing	body	of	scholarship	on	southern	criminology.	The	
coexistence	 of	 state	 crimes	 (and	 their	 memory)	 along	 with	 common	 crimes	 establishes	 a	
framework	 of	 meaning	 in	 social	 relations	 and	 penal	 policies	 that	 is	 usually	 absent	 in	 the	
explorations	of	the	countries	of	the	Global	North.	Therefore,	I	 intend	to	identify	some	of	these	
features	in	the	discourses	and	practices	of	the	penality	of	Argentina	and	other	Latin	American	
countries.	Furthermore,	although	there	are	deep,	detailed	studies	of	penality	and	punitivism	in	
recent	decades	in	Argentina	(see,	basically,	Sozzo	2011,	2014,	2016b),	my	intention	is	to	focus	on	
state	crimes	during	three	important	periods	of	transitional	justice:	the1980s,	the	1990s	and	the	
2000s.	
	
State	crimes	and	transitional	justice	in	Latin	America		
Dictatorships	and	transitions	to	democracy	
In	 recent	 decades,	 many	 Latin	 American	 countries	 have	 undergone	 complex	 transitions	 to	
democracy	 (the	 ‘third	 wave’	 according	 to	 Huntington	 1993)	 from	 the	 repressive	 military	
dictatorships	that	existed	in	the	1960s,	1970s	and	1980s	(for	example,	in	1973,	of	the	ten	Latin	
American	 countries	 of	 Hispanic	 origin,	 only	 Colombia	 and	 Venezuela	 had	 democratic	
governments).	State	crimes	perpetrated	by	these	regimes	involved	serious	violations	of	human	
rights,	which	were	qualified,	as	applicable,	as	mass	crimes,	state	terrorism	or	genocide.	(State	
violence	involving	national	armies	and	para‐military	groups	were	also	a	feature	of	internal	armed	
conflicts	in	some	South	American	and	Central	American	countries.3)	The	example	of	Guatemala,	
for	instance,	is	one	of	the	few	Latin	American	cases	almost	unanimously	qualified	by	observers	as	
genocide.	Several	coups	took	place	between	1954	and	1996	and	it	is	estimated	that,	in	40	years,	
more	 than	 200,000	 people	 died	 or	 disappeared,	 and	500,000	 others,	mostly	 from	 indigenous	
communities,	became	refugees.	Between	1982	and	1983,	in	just	17	months,	100,000	indigenous	
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people	(mostly	men	but	also	many	women	and	children)	were	brutally	killed	 in	 front	of	 their	
families	by	state	troops	looking	for	guerrilleros	(Figueroa	Ibarra	et	al.	2013).	
	
Notably,	 between	 1930	 and	 1983,	 Argentina	 experienced	 six	 coups	 d’état	 led	 by	 military	
interventionism	 (1930,	 1943,	 1955,	 1962,	 1966	 and	1976‐1983)	 in	 between	 short	 periods	 of	
weak	democratic	rule.	Not	all	 the	coups	used	the	same	degree	of	violence	and	not	all	of	 them	
received	 the	 same	 rejection	 and	 resistance	 from	 political	 parties	 and	 large	 sectors	 of	 the	
population.	In	addition,	not	all	of	them	were	supported	by	catholic	fundamentalism	against	the	
‘leftist	subversion	of	Western	values’	in	the	context	of	the	cold	war,	as	was	the	case	of	the	last	
coup.	In	this	framework,	the	broad	use	of	violence	to	solve	political	conflicts	became	naturalized.	
It	included	media	censorship,	illegal	detentions,	breaking	and	entering,	political	imprisonment,	
military	controls	in	the	streets,	summary	executions	disguised	as	confrontation	and	torture	of	the	
opposition	(Bergalli	1984;	Calveiro	2006;	Feld	and	Franco	2015;	Vezzetti	2002).	
	
With	a	return	 to	democratic	 rule	 in	Argentina	 in	1973,	state	and	parastate	violence	 increased	
alongside	 civil	 violence.	 Nevertheless	 after	 the	 coup	 of	 24	March	 1976,	 together	with	 a	 new	
dramatic	 and	 systematic	 increase	 in	 the	 scope	 and	 degree	 of	 violence,	 two	 radical	 changes	
dramatically	modified	the	style	of	historical	repression:	
	
First,	 the	 disappearances	 demonstrated	 the	 development	 of	 an	 obvious	
determination	on	the	part	of	the	state	to	exterminate	its	opponents.	Second,	they	
introduced	a	new	characteristic	to	politically	motivated	murder	–	its	clandestine	
practice.	These	singularities	set	the	case	of	Argentina	apart,	even	from	the	rest	of	
the	 dictatorships	 that	 ruled	 the	 countries	 of	 the	 region	 in	 the	 1970s.	 (Crenzel	
2008b:	174‐175)	
	
It	also	led	to	the	appropriation	of	almost	500	children	and	babies	who	disappeared	with	their	
parents	 or	 were	 born	 in	 detention	 centres	 and	were	 given	 to	 other	 families	 to	 assume	 false	
identities	which	remain	subject	to	discovery	even	to	the	present	day.	
	
The	 dictatorship	 toughened	 the	Penal	 Code	with	decrees	nominated	 and	numbered	 as	 ‘Laws’	
passed	for	many	common	crimes.	In	addition	to	establishing	new	crimes,	the	death	penalty	by	
firing	squad	was	reinstated	(although	never	applied)	and	the	penalty	of	absolute	disqualification	
or	 incapacitation	of	 rights	 introduced	 for	offenses	with	 ‘subversive’	motivation	 (Law	21.338).	
However,	the	severity	of	the	penal	system	was	due	to	authoritarian	and	clandestine	practices.	
Evidently,	official	statistics	do	not	account	for	the	effects	of	these	mechanisms,	which	is	why	it	is	
difficult	to	measure	them	(Sozzo	2016b:	302).	Indeed,	although	there	was	a	police	state,	common	
crime	 was	 not	 the	main	 target	 of	 repression.	 Rather,	 it	 was	 one	 target	 among	many	 others,	
including	a	large	number	of	acts	of	insubordination	(religious,	political,	sexual,	modes	of	dress,	
family	relationships,	music	consumption,	and	so	on)	that	were	never	legislated	as	criminal	but	
were	deemed	as	an	offense	to	Catholic	and	Western	moral	values	which,	it	was	thought,	had	to	be	
rescued	(Crenzel	and	Allier‐Montaño	2015;	Feld	and	Franco	2015;	Vezzetti	2002).	Thus,	leftist	
armed	groups	often	preferred	to	be	identified	as	common	criminals	(and	not	political	enemies)	
to	prevent	torture	or	death.	
	
The	boundaries	between	the	systematic	state	repression	and	the	private,	violent	and	economic	
crimes	 of	 the	 repressors	 were	 blurred.	 Secret,	 clandestine	 and	 systematic	 practices	 of	 state	
repression	 through	 military,	 police	 and	 paramilitary	 forces	 were	 complementary	 but	 they	
sometimes	 overlapped,	 which	made	 it	 easy	 to	 sway	 public	 opinion	 into	 blaming	 ‘subversive’	
groups	for	homicides,	robberies	and	other	ordinary	crimes.	The	population’s	widespread	fear	of	
reporting	crimes	to	the	police	and	the	courts	and	the	censoring	of	the	media	led	to	an	exceptional	
level	of	violence	management	for	state	and	private	purposes.	Thus,	in	addition	to	bureaucratic	
disappearances,	torture	and	killings,	the	dictatorship	also	tolerated	(or	paid	their	collaborators	
with)	 the	 spoils	 of	 war,	 sexual	 abuse,	 vendettas	 and	 private	 businesses,	 extortion	 of	 alleged	
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collaborators	 of	 subversion	 and	 kidnapping	 motivated	 by	 the	 repressors’	 and	 their	 allies’	
personal	interests	(see	Calveiro	2006;	Vezzetti	2002:	175‐180).		
	
In	human	rights	issues,	symbolic	acts	–	even	small	ones	–	express	powerful	meanings	and	help	
build	tools	of	political	struggle.	Today,	the	evocation	of	a	symbolic	number	(for	example,	number	
of	disappeared	people)	or	date,	or	a	label	(‘subversion’,	‘dirty	war’,	‘state	terrorism’	or	‘genocide’)	
can	constitute	emotional	political	banners.	While	supporters	of	the	dictatorship	identified	the	use	
of	force	as	a	‘war	against	subversion’,	‘communism’	or	‘terrorism’,	some	of	its	critics	considered	
it	a	‘dirty	war’	(a	very	controversial	concept	even	today),	with	tens	of	thousands	of	victims,	among	
which	were	union	leaders,	workers,	priests,	human	rights	lawyers,	scientists,	doctors	and	leaders	
of	 political	 parties,	 their	 friends,	 acquaintances	 and	 relatives,	 and	 others	 who	 were	 deemed	
suspicious.	Human	rights	groups	claim	even	to	this	today,	as	an	emblem	or	symbol,	the	number	
of	‘30,000	disappeared’	by	‘state	terror’	in	the	context	of	a	‘genocide’	(Crenzel	2008a;	Feierstein	
2015;	Osiel	1986,	2000:	121).4		
	
In	 general,	 in	 Argentina	 and	 in	 those	 Latin	 American	 countries	 which	 had	 experienced	
transitional	justice,	policies,	debates	and	control	practices	with	respect	to	common	or	ordinary	
crimes	coexist	with	those	related	to	truth,	memory	and	justice	surrounding	serious	human	rights	
violations:		
	
…	 they	have	been	and	are	 still	 the	object	of	 court	proceedings,	 they	are	part	of	
public	discussions	and	political	agendas,	they	have	been	portrayed	in	a	wide	range	
of	 cultural	 productions,	 and	 they	 have	 been	 evoked	 in	 urban	 spaces	 through	
archives,	parks,	monuments,	and	memory	sites,	and	by	way	of	public	policies	that	
seek	to	ensure	that	these	pasts	are	conveyed	to	future	generations.	(Crenzel	and	
Allier‐Montaño	2015:	1)	
	
Latin	America	does	not	account	for	the	worst	nor	the	majority	of	serious	human	rights	violations	
or	mass	atrocities	(compared	with,	for	example,	Nazi	Germany	and	Rwanda)	but	it	helped	build	a	
model	of	individual	criminal	responsibility	for	state	crimes,	whose	main	precedent	had	been	the	
trials	of	Nuremberg	and	Tokyo	after	World	War	II.	Argentina	also	accounts	for	more	than	a	third	
of	the	trials	for	human	rights	abuses	in	the	world	and	most	of	the	transitional	justice	domestic	
trials	(Nino	1997;	Sikkink	1996,	2011;	see	also	Savelsberg	2010;	Transitional	Justice	Database	
Project	2015).	
	
In	this	sense,	I	consider	the	examination	of	the	Argentine	case	may	contribute	to	understand	the	
dynamics	 of	 penality	 in	 other	 Latin	 American	 countries,	 without	 forgetting	 that:	 ‘…	 local	
specificities	 that	 underpin	 the	 relationship	 between	 democratisation	 and	 punishment,	 [are]	
embedded	 …	 in	 national	 histories,	 political	 traditions,	 economic	 trajectories,	 institutional	
arrangements,	and	social	and	cultural	dynamics	…’	(Cheliotis	and	Sozzo	2016:	264).	
	
Common	and	state	crime	and	punishment	in	Argentina		
Argentina	is	emblematic	in	relation	to	the	experience	of	transitional	justice	in	Latin	America	and	
the	 world,	 and	 the	 developments	 and	 debates	 arising	 from	 it	 (Centro	 de	 Estudios	 Legales	 y	
Sociales	(Centre	for	Legal	and	Social	Studies,	or	CELS)	2013:	128;	Osiel	2000;	Sikkink	1996,	2011;	
Teitel	2003).	Due	to	its	early	development,	its	impact	and	the	scope	of	its	juridical	debates,	human	
rights	trials,	convictions	and	sentences,	it	has	had	a	leading	role	in	the	global	trend	known	as	‘the	
justice	 cascade’	 (Sikkink	 1996,	 2011;	 Crenzel	 2015:	 81).	 In	 her	 influential	 book,	 The	 Justice	
Cascade.	How	Human	Rights	Prosecutions	Are	Changing	World	Politics	(2011),	political	scientist	
scholar,	Katryn	Sikkink,	analyses	the	case	of	Argentina	in	a	separate	chapter,	titled	‘…	from	pariah	
state	to	global	protagonist’.	She	suggests	that,	in	the	early	1980s,	after	a	non‐negotiated	transition	
following	 the	 defeat	 of	 the	 Malvinas/Falklands	 war,	 Argentina	 helped	 the	 development	 of	
accountability	mechanisms	such	as	truth	commissions	(to	precede	trials,	not	to	replace	them	as	
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South	 Africa	 post‐apartheid	 did	 in	 the	 1990s)	 and	 also	 to	 establish	 high‐level	 human	 rights	
prosecutions	concerning	the	disappeared	(‘desaparecidos’).	Although	earlier	military	trials	had	
been	held	in	Greece	(1975)	and	Portugal	(1979),	this	unprecedented	decision	in	Latin	America	
was	internationally	compared	with	the	impact	of	the	Tokyo	and	Nuremberg	trials.	Argentina	is	
now	also	the	country	with	the	longest	record	of	prosecuting	human	rights	abuses	that	occurred	
before	the	transition	(Sikkink	2011).	
	
Three	distinct	moments	may	be	identified	in	the	history	of	trials	in	Argentina.	I	examine	them	
concurrently	with	changes	in	ordinary	crime	and	punishment.	
	
The	origin	of	the	state	crime	prosecutions	
The	 first	 occurrences	 began	 in	 late	 1983.	 Argentina	 was	 the	 sole	 country	 in	 the	 region	 not	
governed	by	military	dictatorships	that	continued	to	rule	in	Bolivia,	Brazil,	Chile,	Paraguay	and	
Uruguay.	Democracy	had	been	restored	and,	five	days	after	Raúl	Alfonsín	from	the	Unión	Cívica	
Radical	party	was	sworn	 in	as	president	 (1983‐1989),	he	established	a	 truth	commission,	 the	
CONADEP	(National	Commission	of	Disappeared	People)	to	investigate	disappearances	of	people	
and	 other	 human	 rights	 abuses	 by	 the	 military	 dictatorship.	 Personalities	 from	 culture,	
journalism,	 law,	 religion,	 congressional	 politics	 and	 science	 were	 convened	 to	 form	 the	
commission.	 Some	 human	 rights	 activists	 and	 groups	 seeking	 a	 bicameral	 congressional	
commission	declined	for	different	reasons	to	participate	in	CONADEP	although	an	exception	was	
the	Permanent	Assembly	 for	Human	Rights	or	APDH,	which	voluntarily	provided	 information,	
testimonies	and	material	to	the	inquiry.	The	non‐participants	included	Madres	de	la	Plaza	de	Mayo	
and	Abuelas	de	Plaza	de	Mayo;	Centro	de	Estudios	Legales	y	Sociales	 (CELS);	Servicio	de	Paz	y	
Justicia	 (SERPAJ,	or	 Service	 for	Peace	and	 Justice);	Familiares	de	Detenidos	y	Desparecidos	por	
Razones	Políticas	o	Movimiento	Ecuménico	por	los	Derechos	Humanos	(Ecumenical	Movement	for	
Human	Rights).	These	organizations	had	a	dual	position	since	most	of	them	cooperated	actively	
with	the	CONADEP	but	publicly	continued	to	call	for	the	establishment	of	a	bicameral	commission	
(Crenzel	2008a,	2008b,	2015).	
	
For	over	nine	months,	commission	officials	and	volunteers	travelled	the	country	and	created	local	
delegations	in	the	search	for	missing	people	and	evidence	of	state	crimes	and	their	perpetrators,	
the	destruction	of	evidence,	and	the	existence	of	a	clandestine	systematic	network	of	detention	
and	torture	centers.	After	 initial	disbelief	and	fear,	 the	work	of	these	commission	officials	and	
volunteers	generated	 thousands	of	new	 testimonials	 from	other	 victims,	morgue	and	hospital	
professionals,	police,	the	military,	community	leaders,	religious	leaders	and	other	leaders	with	
first‐hand	knowledge	and	experiences	of	the	clandestine	torture	and	detention	centers	(centros	
clandestinos	de	detención)	that	operated	throughout	the	country	under	military	rule,	in	Córdoba,	
Mendoza,	Santa	Fe	and	Buenos	Aires.	That	was	the	case	of	the	notorious	Escuela	de	Mecánica	de	
la	Armada	(Naval	School	of	Mechanics	or	ESMA),	in	a	central	location	in	the	city	of	Buenos	Aires,	
where	political	detainees	were	tortured	and	 interrogated	before	being	killed.	The	work	of	the	
CONADEP	helped	prove	that	these	centres	had	been	part	of	an	entire	system	of	state	terrorism	
(Crenzel	2008a:	63,	2008b:	179‐181,	2015;	Carrington	2014:	87‐88).	
	
The	 final	 report	with	 the	complete	 record,	 titled	Nunca	Más,	was	presented	one	year	 later,	 in	
1984,	 to	 the	president	on	paper	and	microfilm	 in	a	public	 ceremony.	 It	 comprised	more	 than	
50,000	pages.	A	paperback	version	was	published	for	the	information	of	the	general	public	and	
became	a	best	seller.	(By	2007	Nunca	Mas	had	sold	more	than	half	a	million	copies	and	had	been	
translated	 into	 English,	 Hebrew,	 Italian,	 German	 and	 Portuguese.)	 The	 evidence	 collected	 by	
CONADEP	was	the	prosecution’s	key	resource	in	the	trials	that	led	to	the	conviction	of	the	military	
juntas.	To	date,	all	the	trials	for	the	crimes	of	the	dictatorship	have	been	based	on	the	report	of	
the	CONADEP	and	there	are	numerous	proposals	to	create	a	style	of	CONADEP	for	investigating	
corruption	or	international	terrorism.	In	addition,	‘Nunca	Más’	is	still	the	main	motto	in	human	
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rights	 discourse	 and	 has	 been	 a	 key	 symbol	 subsequently	 replicated	 in	 a	 large	 number	 of	
international	truth	commission	reports.5	
	
As	a	result,	in	1985	nine	former	members	of	the	military	juntas	were	successfully	prosecuted	in	
a	high	federal	civil	court	in	Buenos	Aires	(the	trials	of	the	Juntas)	and	five	others	(ex‐generals	
Videla,	Massera,	 Agosti,	 Viola	 and	 Lambruschini)	were	 convicted	 and	 sentenced	 according	 to	
criminal	law	(and	not	the	military	code)	to	prison	for	crimes	of	aggravated	murder,	kidnapping	
and	multiple	 cases	 of	 torture.	 This	 led	 to	 investigations	 of	 a	 large	 number	 of	 people	 in	 other	
courts.	
	
The	 legality	 and	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 to	 protect	 ordinary	 citizens	 was	
established	based	on	the	rule	of	law.	A	liberal	criminal	orientation	was	maintained,	in	which	the	
human	rights	of	the	accused	and	the	convicted	were	reestablished	while	torture	of	imprisoned	
people	was	punished	severely	(Sozzo	2014:	13).	Criminal	classicism	of	the	eighteenth	century	
and	its	legal	safeguards	were	rediscovered	in	Anglo‐Saxon	countries	through	the	‘justice	model’	
and	 the	 due	 process	 revolution	 of	 1970s.	 In	 terms	 of	 processes	 and	 prison	 conditions,	 these	
guarantees	were	 opposed	 to	 the	 practices	 of	 authoritarianism,	which	were	 always	willing	 to	
consider	 valid	 any	 means	 for	 crime	 control.	 They	 should	 be	 applied	 by	 impartial	 courts	
administering	prospective	and	strict	laws	equally	to	ordinary	crimes	and	state	crimes.	For	this	
reason,	prevention	of	excessive	state	violence	of	any	kind	was	central	so	as	not	to	relapse	into	
authoritarianism.	
	
Therefore,	the	National	Supreme	Court	was	founded,	with	the	aim	of	establishing	democratic	rule	
through	 a	 liberal	 tendency	 towards	 privacy,	 freedom	 of	 speech,	 search	 and	 seizure,	 arrests,	
interrogations	and	drug	possession.	This	approach,	inspired	by	the	role	of	the	liberal	US	Supreme	
Court	(the	‘Warren	Court’)	of	the	1960s,	was	absolutely	novel	in	local	legal	history.	This	enabled	
the	 condemnation	 of	 the	 usual	 practices	 of	 hard	 repression	 of	 the	 dictatorship	 through	 due	
process,	 while	 legitimizing	 the	 performance	 of	 a	 liberal	 criminal	 justice	 system	 to	 protect	
citizenship	in	democracy.		
	
There	were	no	initiatives	clearly	oriented	towards	an	increase	in	the	extension	or	severity	of	the	
penal	system	and,	in	fact,	there	were	several	initiatives	to	decrease	it.	Thus,	international	treaties	
on	human	rights	were	ratified;	these	included	the	American	Convention	on	Human	Rights	(Law	
23.054),	the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	and	the	International	Covenant	
on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	(Law	23.313),	and	the	Convention	against	Torture	and	
Other	Cruel,	 Inhuman	or	Degrading	Treatment	or	Punishment	(Law	23.338)	(Gargarella	2010:	
29).	Further,	rules	of	the	Penal	Code	about	recidivism	and	multi‐recidivism,	suspended	sentences	
and	other	stigmatizing	measures	were	modified	in	favor	of	convicts.	Law	23.070	also	established	
a	beneficial	computation	for	common	and	political	prisoners,	sentenced	or	on	remand,	who	were	
in	prison	in	the	period	between	24	March	1976	and	10	December	1983	(Sozzo	2011:8).	
	
Although	criticism	of	liberal	democracies	for	tolerance	or	softness	in	dealing	with	common	crime	
existed	in	Argentina	and	throughout	Latin	America	(Beckett	and	Godoy	2008)	and	elsewhere,	this	
does	 not	 always	 lead	 to	 unchanged	 punitiveness.	 While	 state	 crimes	 of	 the	 dictatorship	 –	
investigated,	prosecuted	and	convicted	for	violations	of	the	penal	code	–	were	in	the	spotlight,	
common	crimes,	especially	so‐called	street	crimes,	were	not	a	main	concern.	The	media	did	not	
focus	 on	 them	 (except	 the	most	 sensationalist	 press,	which	 also	 sought	 to	 sell	 images	 of	 ‘the	
horror	 show’	 of	 the	 dictatorship);	 they	were	 not	 prominent	 among	 other	 problems	 in	 public	
opinion	nor	were	they	the	focus	of	the	political	campaigns	of	1985	and	1987	(Sozzo	2014:	6).	All	
of	this	happened	in	the	context	of	a	considerable	increase	in	the	registry	of	crimes	in	those	years	
(Kessler	2010:	72).	As	Sozzo	(2011:6)	points	out:		
	
…	between	1983	and	1989,	the	rate	of	crime	and	the	rate	of	intentional	homicides	
recorded	by	police	institutions	increased	by	73%	and	85%,	respectively.	In	some	
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jurisdictions	this	growth	was	even	higher.	In	the	City	of	Buenos	Aires	the	rate	of	
property	crime	–	which	grew	by	65%	in	the	country	–	increased	by	120%,	and	by	
139%	 in	 the	 Province	 of	 Buenos	 Aires.	 In	 this	 province	 the	 rate	 of	 intentional	
homicide	increased	by	137%,	and	by	140%	in	the	Province	of	Santa	Fe	during	the	
same	period.		
	
There	was	one	exception	I	believe	is	noteworthy:	a	few	cases	of	kidnappings	and	murders	with	
the	complicity	of	members	or	 former	members	of	 the	armed	 forces,	 the	police	or	 intelligence	
services	attracted	deep	public	concern	and	media	attention	because	of	the	menace	to	democracy	
they	implied	(Kessler	2009:	73‐75,	2010:	117;	Sozzo	2011).	These	cases	were	described	in	official	
statements	as	cases	of	 ‘unemployed	–	repressive	–	 labor’	(after	the	dictatorship).	Thus,	 in	this	
period,	the	greatest	fears	of	crime	were	associated	with	the	legacy	of	the	authoritarian	past.	There	
was	no	attempt	to	answer	the	fears	of	crime	with	punitiveness	(which	referred,	precisely,	to	the	
authoritarian	past)	but	rather	with	a	further	deepening	of	democratic	institutions.	
	
In	Argentina,	as	in	many	Latin	American	countries	where	there	are	no	official	data,	this	period	
presents	serious	difficulties	in	terms	of	rebuilding	data	relating	to	imprisonment	(Sozzo	2014:	1,	
2016a:	305).	However,	the	data	of	the	federal	prison	service	(which	computes	data	nationwide,	
including	federal	prisons	throughout	the	country	and	prisons	in	the	city	of	Buenos	Aires)	and	of	
the	 provincial	 prison	 services	 of	 the	 province	 of	 Buenos	 Aires	 and	 the	 province	 of	 Santa	 Fe	
(between	1983	and	1989	the	city	of	Buenos	Aires,	and	the	provinces	mentioned	were	the	three	
most	important	demographic	districts)	may	be	used	as	indicators.	Thus,	between	1983	and	1984	
there	was	a	sharp	decline	of	51	per	cent	in	the	number	of	inmates	in	the	federal	prison	service,	
42	per	cent	in	the	prison	service	of	the	province	of	Santa	Fe	and	a	27	per	cent	in	the	Province	of	
Buenos	Aires.	The	number	in	the	Federal	prison	service	in	1984	was	the	lowest	since	1965.	After	
1984,	however,	annual	growth	escalated.	Federal	prisoners	increased	11.6	per	cent	on	average,	
with	 a	 large	 increase	of	 28	per	 cent	 between	1987	 and	1988.	 In	1988	 the	number	 of	 federal	
prisoners	was	just	15	per	cent,	lower	than	at	the	end	of	the	military	dictatorship.	In	the	province	
of	Buenos	Aires	and	the	province	of	Santa	Fe,	the	growth	in	the	number	of	prisoners	was	higher;	
in	1989	it	reached	the	same	number	of	inmates	as	at	the	end	of	the	dictatorship	(respectively,	66	
per	 100,000	 and	 41	 per	 100,000)	 (Sozzo	 2014:	 18,	 2016:	 305).	 This	 situation	 changed	
dramatically	 after	 governmental	 pardons,	 particularly	 in	 the	 mid‐1990s,	 when	 both	 fear	 of	
common	crime	and	the	indicators	of	punitiveness	grew	sharply.	
	
Limits	and	pardons	
The	threat	of	multiple	prosecutions	in	the	Alfonsín	government	and	judicial	decisions	resulted	in	
armed	uprisings	against	the	government	as	well	as	a	deep	public	and	state	fear	of	a	new	coup	
d'etat.	In	that	context,	in	1986	and	1987	hierarchical	condemnations	were	prioritized	and	two	
laws	were	 passed:	 one	 set	 a	 deadline	 in	 the	 presentation	 of	 new	 charges	 (‘Punto	Final’,	 Law	
23.492);	and	another	limited	the	legal	responsibility	of	soldiers	who	acted	under	superior	orders	
(‘Obediencia	 Debida’,	 Law	 23.521)	 except	 in	 cases	 of	 appropriation	 of	 minors.	 This	 highly	
controversial	 decision,	 which	 led	 to	 the	 closure	 of	 most	 of	 these	 criminal	 proceedings,	 was	
followed	by	a	decision	of	the	next	president	–	from	the	opposing	Peronist	party	–	that	seemed	to	
imply	the	complete	end	of	trials	and	punishments.		
	
In	1990,	President	Menem	(1989‐1995‐1999)	launched	the	rhetoric	of	social	reconciliation	and	
–	 as	 chief	 of	 the	 executive	 branch	 –	 pardoned	 the	 convicted	 Junta	members	 and	hundreds	 of	
military,	 state	 officials	 and	 some	 high	 ranking	 members	 of	 leftist	 groups	 that	 were	 facing	
prosecution.	The	Argentine	human	rights	movement	and	the	 families	of	victims,	nevertheless,	
continued	to	press	for	accountability	in	local	and	international	forums.	During	the	1990s,	there	
were	 no	 criminal	 prosecutions,	 but	 ‘Truth	 trials’	 were	 held	 in	 some	 federal	 courts	 to	 gather	
information	 about	 the	 facts	 and	 responsibilities,	 although	 there	 was	 no	 prospect	 of	 criminal	
conviction.	 Relatives	 and	 victims	 also	 filed	 complaints	 with	 courts	 in	 other	 countries.	 They	
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obtained	arrest	warrants	and	extraditions.	In	2001,	the	Inter‐American	Commission	on	Human	
Rights	 –	 whose	 decisions	 must	 be	 followed	 by	 its	 members	 –	 ruled	 against	 the	 impunity	 of	
amnesty	laws	and	pardons	in	crimes	‘against	humanity’	(ruling	‘Barrios	Altos’).	
	
The	disruption	of	criminal	prosecution	and	state	neglect	of	the	serious	crimes	committed	by	the	
dictatorship	can	be	associated	with	the	emergence	of	new	insecurities	which	are	channeled	in	the	
concern	for	common	crime	prompted	by	a	populism	‘from	above’	during	a	decade	that	was	the	
quintessence	 of	 neoliberalism	 in	 Argentina	 (privatizations,	 de‐industrialization	 and	
unemployment).	
	
During	the	1990s,	there	was	a	significant	growth	in	the	number	of	criminal	laws	produced	and,	
contrary	 to	 what	 had	 happened	 during	 Alfonsín’s	 government,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 identify	 laws	
clearly	 oriented	 towards	 increasing	 the	 severity	 and	 extension	 of	 the	 penal	 system,	 but	 also	
certain	 laws	 oriented	 towards	 the	 opposite	 (Sozzo	 2011,	 2016).	 Many	 laws	 implied	 the	
criminalization	 of	 new	 behaviors	 or	 the	 increase	 in	 punishments	 for	 already	 criminalized	
behaviors.	However,	most	of	them	had	a	marginal	impact	on	the	operation	of	the	penal	system,	
being	more	symbolic	than	substantive	in	nature.		
	
It	is	clear	that	common	crimes	became,	once	again,	the	center	of	attention	of	state	reaction.	Drug	
offenses,	 in	 the	context	of	 the	American	 ‘war	on	drugs’,	 increased	 in	 importance	and	this	was	
reflected	 in	 crime	 statistics	 after	 the	 mid‐1990s.	 In	 addition,	 President	 Menem	 repeatedly	
suggested	the	possibility	of	reforming	criminal	law	(and	abandoning	international	agreements)	
to	impose	the	death	penalty	for	trafficking	offenses,	a	proposal	which	had	not	existed	even	during	
the	dictatorship.	Although	this	did	not	happen,	a	new	drug	law	that	incriminated	more	behaviours	
and	was	more	severe	was	enacted	(Law	23.737).	In	addition,	the	National	Supreme	Court	upheld	
more	 conservative	 positions	 on	 issues	 including	 legal	 guarantees	 and	 challenged	 the	 liberal	
position	in	relation	to	drugs	for	personal	consumption	(‘Montalvo’	ruling).	
	
However,	 the	 bombings	 in	 Buenos	 Aires	 of	 the	 Israeli	 Embassy	 in	 1992	 and	 the	 Argentine‐
Israelite	Mutual	Association	(AMIA)	community	center	in	1994	–	with	the	alleged	complicity	of	
members	of	state	and	police	forces	–	resulted	in	a	large	number	of	dead	and	wounded	civilian	
victims.	As	a	result	new,	strong	demands	for	mechanisms	of	accountability	and	justice	against	
impunity	and	power	crimes	were	boosted	and	victim	social	movements	re‐emerged	together	with	
their	demands	for	truth	and	justice	with	regards	to	the	crimes	of	the	dictatorship.	‘Insecurity’	and	
crime	fears	in	Argentina	became	especially	widespread	after	the	mid‐1990s	(Kessler	2009,	2010:	
115‐138).	
	
In	relation	to	officially	registered	crimes:		
	
…	crime	rate	in	the	country	grew	constantly	between	1995	and	2002	(88%).	This	
increase	 was	 similar	 in	 Buenos	 Aires	 city	 (87%)	 but	 extremely	 higher	 in	 the	
Buenos	Aires	Province	(169%).	 Intentional	homicides	grew	more	moderately	 in	
this	period	in	the	country	(28%)	but	to	a	greater	degree	in	Buenos	Aires	Province	
(75%),	compared	to	a	14%	increase	in	Buenos	Aires	city.	(Sozzo	2016b:	309)	
	
Contrary	to	the	dynamic	of	Alfonsín’s	government,	indicators	of	punitiveness	grew:	
	
The	federal	prison	population	increased	52%	between	1989	and	1995,	reaching	a	
level	28%	higher	 than	at	 the	end	of	 the	military	dictatorship.	The	 incarceration	
rate	in	Buenos	Aires	Province	grew	14%	‐reaching	a	rate	15%	higher	than	in	1983‐	
and	 in	Santa	Fe	Province	 it	 increased	7%	‐reaching	 the	 same	 level	 as	 in	1983‐.	
Meanwhile,	 the	rate	of	sentences	 in	the	country	grew	14%,	although	 it	was	still	
18%	lower	than	at	the	end	of	the	military	dictatorship.	(Sozzo	2016b:	307)		
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This	trend	deepened	later	on:	
	
Argentinian	rate	went	from	71/100,000	in	1996	to	123/100,000	in	2002,	a	73%	
increase	 in	 six	 years.	 A	 similar	 growth	was	 observed	 in	Buenos	Aires	Province	
(78%)	and,	to	a	lower	degree,	in	federal	prison	population	(41%).	(Sozzo	2016b:	
311)	
	
Restarting	the	prosecution	of	state	crimes	
Since	the	candidacy	of	Alfonsín	 in	1983,	 the	prosecution	of	crimes	of	 the	dictatorship	had	not	
been	 a	 political	 campaign	 promise;	 however,	 twenty	 years	 later,	 during	 Nestor	 Kirchner’s	
administration	 (2003‐2007),	 Congress	 enacted	 Law	 25.779,	 which	 declared	 the	 invalidity	 of	
‘Punto	Final’	(Law	23.492)	and	‘Obediencia	Debida’	(Law	23.521).	In	2005,	the	National	Supreme	
Court	upheld	Law	25.779	(‘Simon’	ruling)	and,	in	2007,	it	declared	the	pardons	in	relation	to	the	
military	unconstitutional	(‘Riveros’	ruling).	Thus,	state	crimes	of	the	past	were	considered	‘crimes	
against	 humanity’	 and	 laws	 protecting	 or	 limiting	 the	 prosecution	 of	military	 personnel	 and	
accomplices	were	considered	unconstitutional.	This	did	not	extend	to	political	crimes	committed	
by	armed	leftist	organizations.	After	more	than	a	decade	of	lethargy,	the	Kirchner	administration	
called	 for	a	new	foundation	of	 the	struggle	 for	human	rights	and	a	questioning	of	all	previous	
governments	 (including	 their	 own	 political	 party).	 A	 strong	 policy	 of	 memory,	 justice	 and	
punishment	with	respect	to	state	crimes	of	the	dictatorial	past	was	installed	on	the	agenda	and	
supported;	it	was	substantially	maintained	by	Kirchner’s	wife,	who	succeeded	him	as	president	
(Cristina	 Fernández	 de	 Kirchner	 2007‐2011‐2015).	 Human	 rights	 organizations	 and	 victims’	
movements	strongly	supported	these	policies,	and	many	of	them	received	symbolic	and	material	
recognition	from	the	government	(to	the	point	of	becoming	–	very	controversially	–	key	players	
in	politics)	as	never	before.		
	
This	 decision	 revived	 intense	 public	 debates	 about	 the	 dictatorial	 past	 and	 their	 civilian	
accomplices.	 It	 also	 triggered	a	polarization	on	 the	 recent	history	and	around	 the	 silence	and	
crimes	of	those	who	had	participated	in	leftist	armed	organizations	prior	to	the	dictatorship.		
	
In	sum,	from	2003	to	the	end	of	2015,	a	total	of	2,821	people	(military,	police	and	civilians)	were	
indicted	 in	 hundreds	 of	 federal	 investigations	 involving	 multiple	 participants,	 promoted	 in	
several	courts	throughout	the	country.	Many	of	these	had	been	initially	investigated	in	the	1980s	
until	amnesty	laws	and	pardons	took	effect.	The	current	trend	is	to	group	federal	investigations	
around	clandestine	detention	centres	or	common	plans	(like	the	Naval	School	of	Mechanics	or	
ESMA,	‘Automotores	Orletti’,	‘Vesuvio’	or	the	jointly	developed	plan	with	dictatorships	of	Chile	and	
Uruguay:	‘Plan	Condor’,	and	others).	
	
A	large	number	of	the	accused	are	still	under	investigation;	some	died	of	natural	causes	and	a	few	
absconded.	 Strictly	 speaking,	 during	 the	 years	 2006‐2015,	 662	 of	 those	 defendants	 were	
convicted	 on	 trial6	 and	 60	 were	 acquitted.	 Thirty	 eight	 per	 cent	 were	 sentenced	 to	 life	
imprisonment	(‘prisión’	or	‘reclusión’)	with	the	potential	for	parole;	31.5	per	cent	were	sentenced	
to	3‐15	years	in	prison	(ordinary	prisons	for	serious	crimes,	not	military	prisons);	27	per	cent	
were	sentenced	to	16‐25	years;	3	per	cent	to	no	more	than	three	years;	and,	for	the	remainder	
(0.5	per	cent),	a	range	of	other	sentences.	Nearly	one	third	of	the	convictions	were	for	offenses	of	
illegal	 deprivation	 of	 liberty;	 a	 slightly	 smaller	 proportion	 for	 torture	 or	 murder;	 and	 the	
remainder	for	appropriation	of	children,	sexual	violence	or	other	crimes	(CELS	2015;	Ministerio	
Público	Fiscal	de	la	Nación	(MPF)	2015).	
	
In	 the	election	campaign	of	2003,	Nestor	Kirchner,	 the	 future	president,	 linked	 insecurity	as	a	
social	problem	 resulting	 from	 the	 crisis,	 and	unemployment	 and	poverty	as	 generated	by	 the	
neoliberal	reforms	of	the	1990s;	he	also	criticized	economic	crime	and	promoted	prosecution	of	
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crimes	of	the	powerful	(Sozzo	2016a:	193‐94,	2016b:	311).	These	views	were	contrary	to	those	
of	the	other	leading	candidate,	the	former	president	Menem.	
	
Between	2006‐07	and	2015	there	were	several	legal	initiatives	and	moderate	speeches	in	relation	
to	 common	 crime	 and	 no	 initiatives	 to	 increase	 criminal	 severity	 as	 in	 the	 1990s,	 with	 the	
exception	of	new	 incriminations	 for	human	trafficking	(Law	26.364	and	26.842);,	and	murder	
aggravated	by	‘femicide’	and	sexual	‘hate	crimes’	(Law	26.791),	the	impact	of	which	has	not	yet	
become	clear.	This	contrasted	particularly	with	rhetoric	and	initiatives	by	the	Governor	of	the	
Province	 of	 Buenos	 Aires,	 who	 belonged	 to	 the	 same	 political	 alliance	 and	was	 promoted	 by	
Fernández	de	Kirchner	to	presidential	candidate	in	2015.	In	addition,	the	National	Supreme	Court	
added	 more	 prestigious	 and	 less	 conservative	 members,	 supported	 the	 prosecution	 of	 state	
crimes,	and	slowly	returned	to	the	 liberal	criminal	road	of	the	mid‐1980s	for	common	crimes	
(even	 in	 terms	 of	 prison	 overcrowding:	 rule	 ‘Verbitsky’,	 2005;	 and	 possession	 of	 drugs	 for	
consumption:	rule	‘Arriola’,	2009).	
	
However,	 between	 2004	 and	 2005	 an	 event	 characterized	 as	 the	 best	 example	 of	 punitive	
populism	‘from	below’	in	that	decade	led	to	an	escalation	of	penal	reforms,	undoubtedly	aimed	at	
greater	punitivity	for	ordinary	crimes.	I	now	focus	on	this	event.	
	
On	March	24,	2004,	the	anniversary	of	military	coup	of	1976,	President	Kirchner	removed	the	
picture	 of	 Videla,	 the	 first	 president	 of	 the	 dictatorship	 (who	was	 under	 house	 arrest	 at	 that	
moment),	from	the	gallery	of	the	national	military	college.	This	move	was	identified	by	many	as	a	
symbol	of	a	new	era	in	human	rights	policy.	That	same	day,	it	became	public	knowledge	that	Axel	
Blumberg	had	been	 found	killed	 the	previous	day.	He	was	a	 young	upper‐middle	 class	boy,	 a	
victim	of	a	kidnapping	organized	by	a	criminal	gang	with	no	connection	 to	politics.	This	case,	
which	became	 a	 catalyst	 for	 discussions	 on	 security	 and	politics,	was	 extensively	 debated.	 In	
Argentina,	kidnapping	followed	by	death,	as	we	saw	before,	is	linked	not	only	to	fears	of	political	
violence	by	the	state	but	also,	during	the	1970s,	to	fears	of	‘popular’	punishment	or	illegal	ways	
of	 funding	 leftist	 groups	 and,	 during	 the	 transition	 to	democracy	 in	 the	1980s,	 to	 fears	 about	
persistent	authoritarian	structures	of	crime	(Kessler	2009,	2010;	Sozzo	2011,	2016b).	
	
The	‘Axel’	Foundation,	created	by	Axel	Blumberg’s	father,	held	several	demonstrations	(initially	
very	crowded)	in	pursuit	of	security	and	justice	and	in	favor	of	moral	and	legislative	reform.	He	
also	collected	5	million	signatures	in	a	petition	to	be	presented	to	the	executive	and	legislative	
authorities	of	the	national	government	and	the	Province	of	Buenos	Aires	urging	passage	of	a	large	
number	of	criminal	laws,	procedural	and	legal	reforms	of	the	prison	system,	and	administrative	
controls	 pursuing,	 undoubtedly,	 more	 severity	 (Calzado	 and	 Van	 den	 Dooren	 2009;	 Schillagi	
2006;	Sozzo	2011,	2016b).		
	
In	a	few	months	during	2004,	in	the	context	of	the	aforementioned	Blumberg	crusade,	more	than	
ten	 legal	 reforms	 to	 the	 Criminal	 Code	 and	 the	 national	 prison	 law	 increased	 penalties	 or	
restrictions.	 In	 October	 2004,	 penitentiary	 law	 was	 also	 reformed	 in	 order	 to	 rule	 out	 the	
possibility	of	enjoying	temporary	release,	or	discontinuous	prison	and	assisted	liberty	in	cases	of	
aggravated	murder.	This	was	extended	to	other	cases	(Calzado	and	Van	den	Dooren	2009;	Sozzo	
2016b).		
	
The	relationship	of	 the	Kirchner	administration	to	Blumberg’s	crusade	was	ambiguous.	 In	 the	
first	 year,	 before	 the	 great	 social	 support	 of	 Blumberg’s	 claims,	 their	 relationship	 was	 close	
(Blumberg	even	had	personal	meetings	with	the	president	in	the	house	of	government).	These	
meetings	 helped	 him	 gain	 support	 for	 the	 legal	 reforms	 to	 the	 Criminal	 Code	 mentioned	
previously.	 In	 2005,	 long	 after	 human	 rights	 organizations	 had	 questioned	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
protests	 had	 turned	 to	 the	 political	 right	 and	 criticized	 the	 government,	 Blumberg	 and	 the	
government	broke	ties.	The	last	public	demonstration	was	in	August	2006.	A	few	weeks	before,	a	
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federal	court	of	Buenos	Aires	city	had	decided	the	first	conviction	for	crimes	of	the	dictatorship	
after	2003.	
	
The	 upward	 trend	 in	 the	 national	 incarceration	 rate	 reached	 144	 per	 100,000	 inhabitants	 in	
2005:	
	
In	 Buenos	 Aires	 Province,	 the	 increase	was	 even	 higher	 (28%).	 Federal	 prison	
population	 grew	 less	 (9%).	 Sentence	 rates	 increased	 significantly	 by	 29%.	
Moreover,	 the	 severity	 of	 sentences	 intensified:	 suspended	 sentences	 were	
reduced	–	 from	42%	 in	2002	 to	35%	 in	2005	–	and	 longer	 custodial	 sentences	
imposed	–	in	2002,	72%	of	these	convictions	were	for	less	than	three	years	and	
decreased	to	66%	in	2005.	(Sozzo	2016b:	313)		
	
However,	between	2005	and	2007,	 there	was	a	slight	decrease	 in	 the	prison	population,	both	
nationally	and	in	the	Province	of	Buenos	Aires.	It	then	began	to	increase	moderately	–	in	relative	
terms	–	until	2015:	
	
Incarceration	rate	decreased	8%	from	2005	to	2007,	reaching	133/100,000,	and	
so	did	federal	prison	population	by	6%	and	in	the	Buenos	Aires	Province	by	8%.	
This	reduction	is	also	observed	in	sentence	rates:	10%	lower	in	2007	than	in	2005.	
(Sozzo	2016b:	314)	
	
	In	 this	 context,	 imprisonment	 rates	 increased	 moderately.	 Between	 2007	 and	
2013	 the	 incarceration	 rate	 grew	 14%,	 reaching	 152/100,000	 nationwide.	 In	
Buenos	Aires	Province,	it	increased	by	13%	reaching	176/100,000.	Federal	prison	
population	 grew	 by	 9%.	 Sentence	 rates	 remained	 stable,	 but	 the	 amount	 of	
suspended	 sentences	decreased	 (from	38%	 to	32%)	and	 so	did	 short	 custodial	
sentences	(from	66%	to	61%).	(Sozzo	2016b:	316)	
	
Conclusions	
The	criminology	and	sociology	of	punishment	of	common	crimes	and	studies	on	punishment	of	
state	 crimes	 have	 usually	 taken	 different	 paths,	 even	 in	 Latin	 America	where	 it	 is	 extremely	
difficult	not	to	cross	the	lines	that	divide	them.	In	general,	in	Argentina	and	transitional	justice	
countries,	experiences	with	respect	to	common	or	ordinary	crimes	coexist	with	those	related	to	
the	truth,	memory	and	justice	surrounding	serious	human	rights	violations.	
	
In	this	paper	I	aimed	to	contribute	to	the	scholarship	on	southern	criminology	(Carrington,	Hogg	
and	 Sozzo	 2015)	 by	 means	 of	 exploring	 changes	 in	 crimes	 and	 punishment	 of	 state	 crimes	
committed	during	the	last	military	dictatorship	in	Argentina	(1976‐1983)	jointly	with	changes	in	
the	punishment	of	common	crimes	in	a	–	less	usual	–	comprehensive	approach.	
	
It	 is	 uncertain	 whether	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 authoritarian	 past	 will	 lead	 to	 a	 subsequent	
punitivity	in	the	democratic	criminal	justice	system,	or	whether	it	will	prevent	a	recurrence	of	
authoritarian	rule	(Cheliotis	and	Sozzo	2016:	265).	However,	it	appears	that	the	cultivation	and	
maintenance	of	the	collective	memory	of	state	crimes	of	the	dictatorship	in	Argentina	makes	it	
very	difficult	to	promote	claims	of	open	punitiveness	toward	ordinary	criminality	(Sozzo	2011).	
	
It	was	stressed	that	 the	 increased	tolerance	of	common	crimes	of	 the	powerless	was	possible	
during	 the	 governments	of	Alfonsín	 and	Kirchner	 (after	2005)	and	 that	matched	 low	 rates	of	
imprisonment	or,	at	least,	more	moderate	ones	(Sozzo	2016b).	This	seems	to	correlate	with	the	
policy	of	prosecuting	crimes	of	the	dictatorship.	Moreover,	punitivity	towards	common	crimes	in	
the	mid‐1990s	could	be	related	to	the	interruption	of	trials.	
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Criminalizing	the	repressive	practices	of	the	dictatorship	as	serious	human	rights	violations	and	
legal	crimes,	according	to	the	civil	(not	military)	Penal	Code	and	courts	for	federal	crimes,	had	the	
symbolic	and	substantive	purpose	of	denying	state	violence	as	a	legitimate	weapon	of	political	
struggle.	This	situation	continues	today	in	the	 identification	of	these	crimes	as	 ‘crimes	against	
humanity’.	During	thirty	years	of	democratic	rule,	the	fear	of	a	military	coup	did	not	materialize	
but	neither	did	violent	retaliation	against	the	repressors	or	waves	of	lynching	motivated	by	other	
common	crimes,	as	experienced	in	other	Latin	American	regions	(Godoy	2004).	
	
This	 article	 exemplifies	 a	 fruitful	 line	 of	 research	 on	 punishment	 in	 Latin	 America	 and	 other	
countries	with	experiences	of	transitional	justice,	and	also	in	other	parts	of	the	global	where	these	
processes	have	not	taken	place,	as	it	allows	them	to	test	how	far	their	general	assumptions	about	
punishment	are	applicable	beyond	their	borders.	Southern	criminology	should	not	only	challenge	
the	limits	of	the	claims	of	the	grand	narratives	of	the	global	North	but	also	provide	elements	to	
broaden	the	scope	of	understanding	of	their	specific	problems.	
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UBACyT	20020150200141BA	 (2016‐17)	 ‘Castigo	 y	Democracia:	 Teoría	 y	 práctica	 penal	 en	Argentina	 y	 América	
Latina’.		
2	 European	 Criminology	 Group	 on	 Atrocity	 Crimes	 and	 Transitional	 Justice	 (ECACTJ)	 of	 the	 European	 Society	 of	
Criminology	 at	 http://www.esc‐eurocrim.org/index.php/activities/working‐groups/53‐atrocity‐crimes‐and‐
transitional‐justice	
3	The	transition	to	democracy	began	in	different	years:	Ecuador	(1980),	Bolivia	(1982),	Honduras	(1982)	Argentina	
(1983),	El	Salvador	(1984),	Uruguay	(1984);	Brazil	(1985),	Guatemala	(1986),	Haiti	(1991),	Paraguay	(1989),	Chile	
(1990),	Panama	(1990),	Peru	(1980,	2000).	
4	The	CONADEP,	in	nine	months	of	operation,	systematically	documented	at	least	8,961	disappearances.	This	number	
increased	 later	with	new	reports.	Human	rights	groups	have	claimed,	 since	 the	mid‐1970s,	 ‘30.000	disappeared’.	
Discussions	 on	 this	 issue	 are	 not	 innocent	 and,	 even	 now,	 they	 are	 the	 subject	 of	 intense	 divisive	 political	 and	
historical	tension.	Recently,	human	rights	leaders	expressed	indignation	regarding	comments	of	current	President	
Macri	on	the	number	of	people	who	had	disappeared	during	the	dictatorship	and	the	use	of	the	concept	of	‘dirty	war’.	
Macri	answered	in	an	interview:	‘I	don’t	know.	It’s	a	debate	that	I	don’t	want	to	enter	into.	If	it	was	9,000	or	30,000	
…’.	The	concept	of	‘dirty	war’,	widely	used	internationally	since	1980s,	or	other	uses	of	the	term	‘war’	or	‘civil	war’	to	
characterize	the	violence	during	dictatorship,	is	questioned	by	political	and	human	rights	organizations	and	scholars	
who	properly	prefer	to	identify	it	as	state	terror	and	not	to	speak	of	two	sides	with	equal	responsibility	for	violence	
in	a	civil	war.	
5	Arquidiócesis	de	San	Paulo:	Brasil	Nunca	Más	(1985);	SERPAJ	Uruguay,	Nunca	Más	(1989);	Comité	de	Iglesia	para	
Ayudas	 de	 Emergencia,	 Paraguay	 Nunca	 Más	 (1990);	 Proyecto	 Interdiocesano	 de	 Recuperación	 de	 la	 Memoria	
Histórica,	Guatemala:	‘Nunca	Más’	(1996);	ProyectoNunca	Más;	Colombia	‘Nunca	Más’:	crímenes	de	lesa	humanidad	
(2000),	and	other	commission	reports	(Crenzel	2008:	193).	
6	 Despite	 the	 criminological	 importance,	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 judgments	 are	 not	 firm	 in	 legal	 terms,	 since	 the	
convicted	have	the	right	to	appeal	to	the	National	Supreme	Court.	
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